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ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the possibility of using public works to stimulate
farmers’ fertiliser use in India’s SAT. Inadequate replenishment of removed nutrients
and organic matter has reduced fertility and increased erosion rates. Fertiliser use, along
with other complementary measures, can help reverse this process, which ultimately
leads to poverty, hunger, and further environmental degradation. In a high-risk environ-
ment like India’s SAT, there may be a strong relation between off-farm income and
smallholder fertiliser use. Farmers can use the main source of off-farm income, wage
income, to manage risk as well as to finance inputs. Consequently, the introduction of
public works programmes in areas with high dry-season unemployment may affect fer-
tiliser use. This study confirms the relevance of risk for decisions regarding fertiliser use
in two Indian villages. Nevertheless, governments cannot use employment policies to
stimulate fertiliser use. Public works even decrease fertiliser use in the survey setting.
1. Introduction
Sustainability has become an important subject on the political agenda
since the 1980s. Many people have realized that we cannot sustain econ-
omic development if we do not maintain the services and quality of
natural resources over time. Sustainable development, therefore, requires
the utilization of renewable resources at rates less than or equal to the
natural rate at which they can regenerate. Moreover, waste flows to 
the environment should be kept at or below the assimilative capacity of the
environment. Agricultural research and policy in developed countries
tends to stress the latter aspect. A major concern is the contamination of
surface and groundwater from (in)organic fertilisers and pesticides (Parr et
al., 1990). This type of research has limited relevance for the developing
world, where the use of chemical inputs is low except in the most produc-
tive regions. A sharp degradation of natural resources is the basic
challenge to be met in this part of the world (for example Reardon, 1995,
for the Sahel; and Randhawa and Abrol, 1990, for India).
Although several factors have contributed to soil degradation, inade-
quate replenishment of removed nutrients and organic matter has reduced
fertility and increased erosion rates (Bumb and Baanante, 1996). Nutrient
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depletion in India has caused light degradation of 1.9 million hectares of
land, moderate degradation of 10.3 million hectares, and severe degra-
dation of 1.5 million hectares (Lynden and Oldeman, 1997). Declining soil
quality on smallholder soils initiates a process that ultimately leads to
poverty, hunger, and malnutrition, and further environmental degra-
dation (Pinstrup-Anderson and Pandya-Lorch, 1994).
Fertiliser use, along with other complementary measures, can help
reverse the downward spiral of environmental degradation in several
ways (Bumb and Baanante, 1996). First, fertilisers can provide much-
needed nutrients and hence increase crop yields and food production.
Second, higher yields imply more biomass, which helps maintain soil
organic matter and vegetative cover. Third, by increasing crop production
in high-potential areas, fertiliser use can reduce the pressure to clear
forests for crop production. In addition, fertiliser use can help reduce
global warming by enhancing sequestration of carbon in soil organic
matter. 
Despite the country’s impressive record of crop production, India’s per-
hectare use of fertilisers is among the lowest in the world. Overall, less
than half of the nutrients removed with crop production were applied as
chemical fertilisers in 1983 (Randhawa and Abrol, 1990). Fertiliser use
doubled between 1983 and 1999, but this was accompanied by an increase
in cereal production of 40 per cent, pulses of 15 per cent and of other crops
by on average, 50 per cent (FAO, 1999). Moreover, the aggregate numbers
obscure strong regional differences. Production growth has come about
largely in irrigated agriculture, and the government is increasingly con-
cerned about the exorbitant use of fertilisers in these areas. On the other
hand, agriculture has developed little in rain-fed areas. Although 70 per
cent of the country’s gross cropped area is farmed under rain-fed con-
ditions, dryland agriculture receives only 20 per cent of total fertiliser in
1983 (Randhawa and Abrol, 1990). What is more, a significant share of cul-
tivated area does not receive any fertiliser at all. Application of animal
manure and atmospheric deposits somewhat reduce the gap between
nutrient removal and replenishment resulting from low fertiliser use, but
not enough to prevent the depletion of large dryland areas.
The existing nutrient deficits will have an adverse effect on food security
and resource conservation, unless additional efforts are made to promote
higher levels of fertiliser use in an environmentally sound manner (Bumb
and Baanante, 1996). In the near future, a significant increase in the use of
organic fertilisers is not feasible in India’s semi arid tropics (SAT). Farmers
value manure highly but apply far less than they view as desirable, as fodder
availability limits the number of livestock that can be kept. Moreover,
biomass scarcity makes the economics of mulching and green manuring in
dryland agriculture decidedly unattractive (Walker and Ryan, 1990).
The effective promotion of fertiliser use requires clear insights in the
determinants of input use at the farm level. Macroeconomic factors, such
as the exchange rate, foreign exchange availability and inflationary pres-
sures are important, but cannot explain differences in fertiliser application
between neighbours or even regions. To explain these, we need to look
into the farmers’ microeconomic environment. For India’s SAT, major fea-
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tures are the large variability of crop yields, the limited development of
(especially long-term) financial markets and the importance of wage
income for smallholder livelihood.
Wage income may have a strong impact on crop production in general
and fertiliser use in particular. Households can use wage income to pur-
chase fertilisers if they are unable or unwilling to take production loans
(Reardon et al., 1994). Moreover, wage income may help reduce the vari-
ance of overall household income and improve food security by allowing
the household to buy food in cases of yield shortfalls (Reardon, 1997).
Households earning much wage income may, therefore, increase the risk-
iness (and profitability) of their agricultural activities. Depending on the
relation between fertiliser use and production risk, this will lead to either
an increase or a decrease in fertiliser use (Hanus and Schoop, 1989).
The above indicates that rural employment policies can lead to changes
in smallholder fertiliser use. Village labour markets are reasonably com-
petitive and responsive to the forces of supply and demand (Walker and
Ryan, 1990). Nevertheless, in some areas unemployment rates are rela-
tively high during the slack season. Employment policies could stimulate
the use of inorganic fertilisers in these areas, provided that wage income
increases fertiliser use. 
Despite the potential importance of wages and other sources of off-farm
income for agricultural decisions, few researchers cover this topic.
Nonfarm income is sometimes included as an explanatory variable in
regressions of farm decisions (for example Savadogo, Reardon, and
Pietola, 1994). However, this does not shed light on the workings of the
underlying decisions and constraints. Off-farm income is an integral part
of the household’s decision-making process, which concerns all income
generating activities and consumption (De Janvry, 1994). Only within this
context, can we expect to reveal the impact of off-farm income on fertiliser
use. Hence, this paper develops an analytical model that shows the
rationale behind household decisions regarding labour allocation and fer-
tiliser use under risk and credit constraints. Contrary to previous research,
the empirical analysis allows distinction between the effects of risk and
credit constraints. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the
problem of soil mining and describes the interaction between risk, credit,
and fertiliser use in India’s SAT. Section 3 introduces an analytical model
of farm–household decision making. The model elucidates the relations
described in section 2 and shows the potential effects of labour income on
fertiliser use. In section 4, we examine empirical estimates of the determi-
nants of household-level fertiliser use for two villages representing distinct
agroecological and policy regions in India’s SAT. Section 5 presents policy
recommendations and concludes. 
2. Fertiliser use in India’s SAT
2.1. Fertiliser use and sustainability
A recent survey on human-induced soil degradation reports that erosion
and depletion of plant nutrients is slowly reducing about 80 per cent of the
cultivated land in the SAT to unproductive, parched terrain (Lynden and
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Oldeman, 1997). The magnitude of soil mining in rainfed agriculture is
huge. Estimates of average nutrient removal are as high as 200 kg of N, 
30 kg of P and 150 kg of K per hectare during the last decade (NRMP,
2000b). In many areas the situation has reached the point where produc-
tion gains cannot be achieved without substantial increase in inputs.
Nevertheless, farmers rarely perceive erosion and soil depletion as a high-
priority problem. The losses in current productivity are low and can be
masked by increased levels of inputs. Still, the losses are alarming in the
long run or on a large area basis (Koala, 1999). Counteracting nutrient
depletion requires an integrated approach including the use of organic as
well as mineral fertilisers.
Out of concern for the limited sustainability of current production
systems, the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics (ICRISAT) has initiated several projects focussing on improved
nutrient management. A region that gets special attention is Mahbubnagar
district, which is representative of rainfall-unassured red soil (alfisol)
areas. The district has degraded soils with low fertility, and the main
nutrient constraint is nitrogen (NRMP, 2000a). Other regions that get
special attention are those areas with medium-textured black soils (vertic
inceptisols). These areas are prone to severe degradation. Major con-
straints to crop production on these soils are soil erosion and depletion of
nutrients.
In the empirical analysis, we use data from two villages: Aurepalle in
Mahbubnagar district, which represents red-soil areas; and Kanzara in
Akola district, which represents medium-textured black-soil areas. In
both villages, the use of inorganic fertilisers is low but increasing (see
figures 1a and b). Fertiliser use was more widespread in Kanzara than in
Aurepalle. Especially in the latter village, farmers have applied fertilisers
disproportionately to irrigated area. The picture is changing, as more and
more farmers apply fertilisers on their dryland crops. Nevertheless, some
dryland fields remain unfertilised and the amount of nutrients applied on
fertilised fields is low. Tentative nitrogen balances for the major crops
and crop mixtures in the two study villages indicate that nutrient
removal is at least as high as the SAT averages presented above (see table
1).
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Figure 1. Spread of fertiliser use in two villages in India’s SAT, 1975–1984
(a) share of fertilised fields; (b) kg nutrients/ha on fertilised fields
2.2. Fertiliser use in a high risk environment
Perhaps the most influential characteristic of India’s SAT is the high vari-
ability of rainfall. The resulting yield uncertainty is the main source of
income risk for farm households (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Ideally, farmers
would use intertemporal markets to shield consumption from variations in
income. In reality, informational asymmetries and covariance of risk
impede the development of markets for insurance and long-term credit,
and the consumption-smoothing capacity of farm households is limited
(Townsend, 1994). Consequently, farmers will try to restrict risk exposure
to shocks that can be handled with the means available.
One way to limit income variability is through adaptations in input use:
inputs affect not only the level of output, but also its variability (Just and
Pope, 1979). The relation between fertiliser use and the riskiness of crop pro-
duction is ambiguous and depends on the specific environment, crop and
technology. Some researchers do not find significant effects of fertiliser
intensity on yield variability (for example, Smale et al. (1998) and Traxler et
al. (1995) for wheat in the Punjab of Pakistan and Mexico, respectively). On
the other hand, Hanus (1989) concludes that nitrogen applications at the
beginning of growth reduce the variability of wheat and barley yields, while
applications at later stages increase yield variability. Besides timing, the
level of technology shapes the relation between nitrogen and yield vari-
ability, as two studies on Philippine rice cultivation illustrate. In the humid
and semi-humid areas of the Philippines, nitrogen is risk reducing for
modern rice varieties under careful management (Antle and Crissman,
1990), but moderately risk increasing under average conditions (Roumasset,
1989). Hence, whether fertiliser increases or decreases yield variability is
essentially an empirical matter that may well vary considerably from site to
site (Hanus and Schoop, 1989). It is, for example, not possible to extrapolate
results from the humid and semi-humid tropics to dryer areas, as the fre-
quent occurrence of moisture stress could interact with nitrogen to produce
greater yield variability with nitrogen application (Smith and Umali, 1985).
Environment and Development Economics 491
Table 1. Tentative nitrogen balances for the study villages (kg/ha)
Aurepalle Kanzara
Sorghum/pearl Castor Hybrid Cotton/pigeon
millet/pigeon sorghum pea/local 
pea sorghum
Nitrogen additions
manure 0 0 0 0
fertiliser 0 0 15 0
biological N fixation 3 0 0 5
atmospheric deposition 5 5 5 5
Nitrogen losses
removal with crop 24 18 63 23
leaching 5 5 7 4
volatilization 10 10 15 10
Balance 31 28 65 27
Sources: Dev (1994), NRMP (2000a), Pol (1992), Walker and Ryan (1990).
Farmers risk perceptions, moreover, do not necessarily coincide with the
technical effect of fertilisers on yield variability. Empirical evidence indi-
cates that fertilisers increase the yield variability of sorghum yields in the
USA. Nevertheless, SriRamaratnam et al. (1987) found that ten out of 12
Texas sorghum producers considered nitrogen fertiliser to be risk
reducing. Consequently, typical US farmers apply more nitrogen than the
profit-maximizing level (Babcock, 1992). This is rational, if ex post optimal
fertiliser rates are positively correlated with yield.1 In this case, fertilising
for average conditions leads to relatively high levels of foregone income in
good years, while the costs of some additional fertilisers in normal years
are relatively low (Babcock and Blackmer, 1994). Uncertainty about the
availability of nitrogen in the soil can also explain the observed high levels
of nitrogen application. If the marginal product of nitrogen is a convex
function, increasing uncertainty about the availability of soil nitrogen will
increase nitrogen application. This is true for many continuous functions,
such as the Cobb–Douglas, and for those that contain a plateau (Babcock,
1992). The intuition of this result is that increasing nitrogen usage above
the amount that is needed on average imposes less loss when soil nitrogen
is abundant than the gain when soil nitrogen is deficient.2
2.3. Labour income and fertiliser use
Adaptations in input use are not the only possible strategy for income sta-
bilization: farmers can also diversify their income off-farm. In rural areas
of India’s SAT, the major source of income besides crop production is the
labour market. Income earned in this market has a potentially strong
impact on risk: early season income may serve as a certain consumption
floor (ex ante risk management), while end-of-season income can be used
to compensate for actual yield losses (ex post risk coping).
Labour income can also provide a substitute for short-term credit for
farmers who are not able or willing to obtain a production loan. Contrary
to the compelling evidence on the limited availability of consumption-
smoothing credit, empirical evidence on the adequacy of short-term
production credit is mixed. Several studies indicate that most smallholders
have some access to short-term formal loans. A study in three SAT villages
between 1975 and 1984 shows that the only farm households systemati-
cally excluded from institutional credit are the rare households headed by
widows (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Studies from other parts of India present
a similar picture: for example 74 per cent of all households that want a
formal loan can get one in the economically diverse state of Uttar Pradesh
(Kochar, 1997b). Moreover, access to formal or informal credit does not
affect land rental decisions in that state (Kochar, 1997a). According to
Kochar, this suggests that lack of access to credit does not constrain house-
holds in their working capital requirements. He, therefore, concludes the
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1 This condition holds if fertiliser is inexpensive relative to its marginal value in
production when less-than-optimal rates are applied.
2 The farmers in the study area are likely to have imprecise knowledge about the
level of fertiliser deficiency, and hence not know the exact optimal level of fer-
tiliser application.
following: ‘the finding . . . suggests that credit constraints cannot explain
levels of input use’. However, credit constraints may affect input intensity
even if they do not influence the size of the cultivated area. All-India dis-
trict-level data indicate that this may be the case for Indian smallholders:
the availability of formal credit, as measured by the availability of credit
institutions, is an important determinant of agricultural input use
(Binswanger and Khandker, 1993).
The use of wage income to manage risk and liquidity requires buoyant
labour markets. In India’s SAT, the bulk of labour is traded in the daily
rated labour market, which is flexible and impersonal in nature. Linkages
with the markets for land and credit are the exception rather than the rule.
Nevertheless, in some areas there is excess supply of labour during the dry
season. Previous research shows that this limits the use of labour markets
to stabilize total income (van den Berg, 2000). A comparison between two
villages indicates that households adjust labour supply to realized yields
only in the village having a year-round public works programme. In the
other village, limited dry-season employment possibilities prevent house-
holds from using this strategy. By way of compensation, they work longer
hours in the growing season in order to create a buffer for yield risk. 
3. A simple farm household model
This section develops an analytical model that describes potential relations
between risk, credit constraints, labour income, and fertiliser use. The
model covers a single agricultural year, as farmers have only limited
capacity to smooth consumption between years. We assume that labour
markets are perfect: labour can be hired in and out at a single wage rate at
all desired levels. This allows us to show the potential impact of wage
income on fertiliser use. In the next sections, we consider the consequences
of dry-season unemployment and the effects of employment-generating
policies on fertiliser use.
The model starts from a whole-farm production function. In the planting
and growing season, the household allocates labour (L1) and inorganic fer-
tilisers (I) to plant and grow a crop on a given acreage (A). At this moment,
the future output is uncertain due to exogenous stochastic factors, such as
weather and pest infestation (). The impact of possible shocks on crop
yields depends not only on the quality of the farmer’s land () but also on
the level of inputs
Q  f (A,L1,I)  h(A,L1,I),   N(0,1) (1)
The equation is formulated such that E(Q)  f(A,L1,I) and Var(Q) 
(h(A,L1,I))
2. This way, the effects on mean and variance of output can be
independent.3 QV (the marginal product of variable input V  L1,I) is
always positive, while hV (the marginal risk effect of an input) is positive
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3 We feel that the assumption of normality is a good enough approximation of
reality, as Walker and Ryan (1990) conclude that most improved cropping
systems and traditional intercrops are characterized by normal yield distributions
in the two study villages. Besides, our empirical estimates account for the farmers’
risk perception of an input, and not its effect on yield variability. 
for risk-increasing inputs and negative for risk-decreasing inputs (Just and
Pope, 1979).
We assume a linear harvest-stage production function. In other words:
the total labour required in harvesting operations (L2) is proportional to the
harvested crop (Saha, 1994)
L2  Q (2)
where  is some positive constant.
Besides, through crop production, the household can generate income
through wage employment. Labour can be hired in and out freely at a
single wage rate (w). While in India’s SAT the availability of long-term
credit is limited, an extensive network of co-operatives and informal
lenders provide short-term production credit. The model, therefore, allows
for borrowing in the planting stage (B). All loans must be repaid at har-
vesting at interest rate r, and there is a maximum amount that a household
can borrow (Bm). The size of this amount depends on the characteristics of
the household (Z). Hence, the budget constraints are
C1  w1(F1  L1)  B (3)
C2 p( f(A,L1,I)  h(A,L1,I)) w2(F2  L2)  (1  r)B (4)
B  Bm(Z) (5)
where p denotes the output price. L is the sum of family and hired labour
in farm production, while F is the household’s total labour supply, that is
the sum of on-farm and off-farm family labour.
The difference between each period’s total time endowment (T) and
family labour supply (F) equals home time ()
t  Tt  Ft t  1,2 (6)
The household facing these constraints maximizes the utility (U) of con-
sumption (C) and leisure () in both stages. Households are risk-averse and
prudent, and the precise form of the utility function depends on the house-
hold’s characteristics (Z). The household decision variables are family
labour supply (F) and labour use (L) in both stages, and borrowing (B) in
the planting stage. 
The above implies that the harvest-stage decision problem is
W  Max
F2
U(C2,	2;Z) Ui 
 0; Uii 0; U iii 
 0; i  C,	 (7)
subject to
C2  (p w2)Q*  w2F2  (1  r)B* (8)
2  T2  F2 (9)
where B* and Q* are predetermined, and p, T2, w2, and r are given. Hence,
household decisions regarding B, L1 and I affect F2, either directly or
through their impact on crop output.
Substituting equations (8) and (9) into equation (7) gives
W  Max
F2
U((p w2)Q*  w2F2  (1  r)B*,T2  	2;Z (10)
494 Marrit van den Berg
The first-order condition is
U2  2UC2 (11)
This is the standard condition for consumer utility maximization. Given
the level of full income, the household chooses between the consumption
of goods and leisure. When crop profits (and consequently full income) are
low, the household can increase labour supply in order to smooth income
ex post.
Hence, the planting-stage decision problem is
V  Max
L1,F1,B
(U(C1,1;Z)  EW(Q1*,B*)) Ui 
 0; Uii  0; i  C, (12)
subject to
C1  w1(F1  L1)  B (13)
B  Bm(Z) (14)
1  T1  F1 (15)
where  is the intertemporal discount factor, and E denotes expectation. 
The Lagrangian for this problem is
  U[w1(F1  L1)  B,T1  F1]  EU[(  w2)(f(A,L1,I) 
 h(A,L1,I))  w2F2  (1  r)B,T2  F2;Z]  (Bm  B)
(16)
which we get through inserting equations (13), (15), (10) and (1) into equa-
tion (12). Moreover, the Lagrangian multiplier  accounts for the
borrowing constraint (equation (14)).
The four decision variables are L1, I, B, and F1. Recall that the choice of
L1, I, and B affects harvest-stage decisions regarding F2. Moreover, the sto-
chastic stock () affects Q and thus L2 and F2. Hence, Q, L2, and F2 are
uncertain in the planting stage. We can now derive the planting-stage
Kuhn–Tucker conditions (see appendix)
U1  w1UC1 (17)
fv   hV (18)
UC1  (1  r)EUC2   (19)
  0 (20)
B  Bm(Z) (21)
where  
 0 if B  Bm, and pV is the price for variable input V (w1 for L1 and
pi for I). Note that equation (18) represents the first-order conditions for
both variable inputs: labour and fertilisers. Combining equations (18) and
(19) gives
fV  pV   hV (22)
E(UC2)

EUC
2


(p  w2)EUC2
1  r

p  w2
E(UC2)

EUC
2
UC

EUC
2
pV

p  w2
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Equation (22) demonstrates the impact of risk and credit constraints on the
use of inputs in crop production. First, consider the impact of risk. Risk
causes non-separability of production and consumption decisions.
Consequently, the value of the marginal product of an input is not equal to
the discounted price even after correcting for harvesting costs (w2). The
difference is a correction factor that covers the joint effect of household risk
preferences and the marginal risk effect of the input. The sign of this cor-
rection factor is ambiguous and depends on the sign of the marginal risk
effect of the input at hand. 
In the presence of credit constraints, the household may not be able to
attain maximum expected utility as described in the previous paragraph.
If credit demand exceeds the availability of credit, the household will take
the maximum loan available and allocate resources and consumption
accordingly. Hence, the household will consume less and use less inputs
than it would in the absence of a credit constraint. Whether or not credit
constraints are binding depends not only on the availability of credit and
on objective factors such as land size and production risk, but also on
household preferences. Prudence, for example, may limit borrowing,
because farmers want to avoid repayment requirements after a bad
harvest. 
Risk and credit constraints induce farmers to decide simultaneously on
input use and family labour supply (equation 17). Hence, potential labour
income, as measured by the family labour endowment, will influence the
use of fertiliser. Several possible effects are easily understood intuitively.
Planting-stage labour income is secure, even if crops fail. This lowers the
disutility associated with yield loss. Besides, farmers can use labour
income to compensate for crop income losses by increasing labour supply
after (and during) a bad harvest. Finally, labour income increases house-
hold liquidity and the capacity to self-finance fertiliser use.
4. Farmers’ fertiliser use
The above model shows that many factors affect fertiliser use in the pres-
ence of risk and credit constraints. Farmers not only account for relative
prices and the available resources and technology, but also for, for
example, the riskiness of production, the possibility to maintain acceptable
levels of consumption after a bad harvest, and the availability and price of
short-term credit or other sources of liquidity. This leads to the following
decision rule for fertiliser use
 F(A,p,w1,w2,pi,r,,T1,T2,,Z) (23)
This equation is part of an integrated set of household decisions regarding
income generation and risk management. Focussing on just fertiliser use
may somewhat limit the efficiency of the estimates, but does not bias the
results.
For empirical estimation of the above reduced-form equation, we used
data from two Indian villages for the period 1975–1984: Kanzara and
Aurepalle. The data were collected by resident investigators from
ICRISAT. With three-to-four-week intervals the investigators collected
I

A
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data on household transactions, labour and draught power utilization, and
crop cultivation. Annually, they updated information on the composition
of the household and asset ownership (Walker and Ryan, 1990).
The villages represent different biophysical and socio-economic regions
of India’s SAT. Major differences relate to the productivity and riskiness of
crop production and the households’ capacity to use labour markets to
manage risk. Both the average productivity of agriculture and the stability
of yields are lower in drought-prone Aurepalle than in rainfall-assured
Kanzara (see section 2.1). Farmers in both villages use labour market par-
ticipation to stabilize income. In Kanzara, a public-works programme
provides year-around employment. This allows households to increase
labour supply when yields are low. High dry-season unemployment
inhibits the use of this strategy in Aurepalle. However, farmers in this
village work longer hours in the planting season if they face higher pro-
duction risks (van den Berg, 2000).
The above indicates that income variability is highest in Aurepalle for
two reasons: (i) higher yield risks; (ii) limited possibility to use the labour
market for income smoothing. This high variability of income may not be
a problem, because the largely informal village financial market favours
the use of credit for consumption smoothing: 75 per cent of the income-
shortfall households were net borrowers. This contrasts Kanzara, where
formal credit has replaced informal loans, and borrowing did not increase
in low-income years. Nevertheless, the (limited) availability of consump-
tion-smoothing credit did not prevent Aurepalle households from facing a
higher variability of consumption than their compatriots in Kanzara face. 
4.1. Estimation issues
In order to account for the above-mentioned inter-village differences, we
estimate separate fertiliser functions for Aurepalle and Kanzara. We use
data on the application of the most frequently utilized nutrient: nitrogen.
As only some of the farmers apply nitrogen, we could use either Tobit or a
combination of Probit and truncated regression. We have selected the
second option, for tests strongly reject equality of the effects of the inde-
pendent variables on the decision to use fertilisers and the quantity of
fertilisers used. The reported variance estimators are robust for the panel
nature of the data: the estimation method does not assume independence
of the observations for a single household. This is important, since some
farmers may possess higher-quality soils than others, either through
inherent qualities of their land or through continuous investment in soil
quality.
The estimated fertiliser functions cover irrigated as well as dryland pro-
duction. Estimation of the level of nitrogen use in dryland production was
not possible for Aurepalle farmers: the resulting number of cases is too
small to run a sensible truncated regression. For the other equations, the
estimates for dryland alone are similar to those for total cultivated area.
Only the latter are presented below.
We calculate the ‘riskiness’ of crop production () using the two-
stage method outlined by Just and Pope (1979). Just and Pope define a
composite production function which is the sum of two functions—a
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regular production function specifying the effects of inputs on the mean of
output; and a function specifying the effects of inputs on output variance
(see also equation (1)). Step one covers the estimation of the regular pro-
duction function. The residuals of this regression are estimates of the
standard deviation of output. Step two involves regression of these resid-
uals on the input variables. The resulting equation serves to compute the
standard deviations of crop production for each farmer. As we need a
measure of ex ante risk, we do not use conventional inputs in our
regression. Instead, we regressed output on cultivated area, share of irri-
gation, land value, a time trend, and some proxies for the farmer’s weather
information: the share of crops for which the adoption is known to be sen-
sitive to expectations of weather (Kochar, 1999).
The set of household characteristics (Z) is specified such that it covers
proxies for the household’s risk aversion and its access to credit and
alternative sources of liquidity. We include the value of liquid assets,4 the
size of area owned and the value of livestock in the equation. Liquid assets
and livestock income are alternatives to credit, while land ownership
serves as collateral. Moreover, asset endowments serve as proxies for risk
aversion: wealthier households have more possibilities to smooth con-
sumption between years. These smoothing options are more important for
risk behaviour than pure risk preferences (for example, Rosenzweig and
Binswanger, 1993). Besides, we add a number of other proxies for house-
hold preferences and farming skills: the age of the household head, caste,
the number of literate household members, and the number of household
members with secondary education (see table 2).
In order to detect non-linearities in the relation between risk, asset own-
ership, and fertiliser use, we included interaction terms and quadratic
variables in a first regression. Only the interaction term between risk and
liquid assets appeared influential and was retained in the final regression.
Moreover, we included a quadratic term for cultivated area in the Kanzara
equations. In the case of Aurepalle, inclusion of such a term only decreased
the significance of the effect of cultivated area.
All prices used are village averages. There are four relevant wage rates:
the planting and harvest wage for male and female labour, which farmers
consider as separate inputs. However, these wage rates are highly corre-
lated, and we include only female planting wage rates to prevent
multicollinearity. We ignore the interest rate, as data availability is limited
and village averages appear to be stable. Since animal traction is a third
important input besides labour and fertilisers, we incorporate bullock
hiring prices and a dummy for bullock ownership to account for possible
hiring restrictions. Other additional variables are a time trend and the
share of irrigated area. 
4.2. Results
Our estimation results give a clear impression of the effects of risk, short-
term credit constraints, and family labour on the use of fertilisers in the
two study villages (see table 3). Risk strongly affects the use of fertiliser,
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the survey households (1976–1984) 
Aurepalle (N  258) Kanzara (N  255)
Mean Standard dev. Mean Standard dev.
Inorganic nitrogen use
nitrogen intensity (kg/ha) 5.29 10.31 11.49 14.43
nitrogen for users (kg/ha) 12.16 12.70 17.48 14.57
% of cases with nitrogen 
 0 0.43 0.50 0.65 0.48
Agricultural Resources
cultivated area (ha) 3.37 2.88 5.74 7.03
irrigated area/total area 0.10 0.17 0.03 0.11
‘riskiness’ of crop production 1,785.41 1,516.60 2,811.31 2,922.91
bullock owned (yes  1) 0.60 0.49 0.56 0.50
Prices
female planting wage rate (Rs/hr) 0.60 0.25 0.65 0.12
bullock price (Rs/hr) 1.40 0.20 2.23 0.28
nitrogen price (Rs/kg) 5.99 0.54 6.82 1.11
Skills
farm caste (yes  1) 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.50
age household head 53.62 12.49 43.78 9.61 
number of literate adults 1.30 1.94 2.40 1.96
adults with secondary education 0.37 0.84 0.59 1.17
Assets
liquid assets (Rs) 4,730.40 7,859.29 6,143.32 11,659.71
owned land (ha) 49,182.01 72,926.08 34,833.73 47,750.06
livestock ownership (Rs) 4,254.94 4,399.02 2,040.74 2,514.29
Labour endowment
adults 3.76 1.62 4.19 2.17
Note: all monetary values are in 1983 prices.
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Table 3. Estimates of nitrogen intensity in two villages in India’s SAT (‘76–’84)
Aurepalle Kanzara
Probit Truncated Probit Truncated
(N  258) (N  113) (N  255) (N  162)
Agricultural resources
cultivated area (ha) 0.55003*** 1.39279** 0.48587** 4.84526***
(0.21113)a (0.53886) (0.22368) (1.36674)
cultivated area squared 0.02120* 0.00125* 0.09126**
(0.01131) (0.00522) (0.02635)
irrigated area/total area 15.0571*** 22.9887 1.27815 7.38357
(3.56028) (16.7270) (1.94908) (8.03022)
expected yield (Rs/ha) 0.00094 0.00345 0.00049** 0.00541**
(0.00076) (0.00360) (0.00023) (0.00237)
‘riskiness’ production 0.00010 0.00328** 0.00055 0.00592***
(0.00044) (0.00163) (0.00039) (0.00172)
bullock owned (yes  1) 0.82394** 4.17901 0.03435 6.33965**
(0.37040) (2.65223) (0.31512) (2.80163)
Pricesb
wage rate (Rs/hr) 0.38589 89.5722 1.08924 7.65913
(4.04973) (56.9369) (3.12701) (17.7017)
bullock price (Rs/hr) 1.41675 7.84415** 3.70074*** 1.88930
(1.11206) (3.43747) (0.99380) (12.5448)
nitrogen price (Rs/kg) 0.71183** 7.02686 0.50856 2.91154
(0.32176) (6.23883) (0.31040) (2.35553)
Skills
age household head 0.04091*** 0.19428* 0.00919 0.37828***
(0.01415) (0.10342) (0.01392) (0.12248)
number of literate adults 0.32469 1.02578 0.06879 0.39797
(0.24209) (0.99589) (0.15008) (1.00813)
adults with secondary 0.34086 1.75607* 0.13989 1.47197
education (0.28794) (0.89532) (0.24840) (1.22094)
farm caste (yes  1) 1.00632 3.55968 0.89143*** 5.23487*
(0.64840) (3.64464) (0.23083) (2.93350)
Assets
liquid assets (1,000 Rs) 0.20163* 0.03127 0.13240** 0.75138**
(0.11371) (0.15143) (0.05267) (0.35074)
liquid assets (1,000 Rs)  0.00016** 0.00003 0.00008*** 0.00008*
riskiness (0.00006) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00004)
owned land (ha) 0.12588*** 0.06500 0.02499 0.06053
(0.03248) (0.13509) (0.05865) (0.22446)
livestock ownership 0.01973 0.37750 0.01101 1.14427
(1,000 Rs) (0.03689) (0.14038) (0.22767) (0.78507)
Labour endowment
adults 0.32274* 0.32654 0.04992 1.39981**
(0.16819) (0.91345) (0.08872) (0.61008)
Other
year 0.32937 4.53887 0.11126 2.33781**
(0.21629) (3.17474 (0.10326) (1.16531)
constant 25.2195 366.519 13.7842 164.896
(15.3211) (284.554) (9.20742) (114.337)
 5.30984*** 8.94060***
(0.61320) (0.86450)
Wald 2 173.52 7,414.37 287.01 771.86
pseudo R2 0.67 0.36
Notes:
a Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for within household
dependence of observations. 
b Previous year output prices for the major crops are included in the regression but not in
the table: paddy and castor in Aurepalle, cotton in Kanzara, pigeon pea and sorghum in both
villages.
while the impact of credit constraints appears to be negligible. Despite the
importance of risk for fertiliser use and the potential use of family labour
to manage risk, increased fertiliser use is not a by-product of policies
enhancing employment. On the contrary, a decrease in unemployment
will even lead to a decrease in fertiliser use. The rest of this section elabo-
rates on these and other results of the regression.
In both villages farmers increase the amount of nitrogen applied in
response to risk. This coincides with the behaviour of US farmers as
described in section 2. On the other hand, risk does not directly affect the
probability of nitrogen use. The effect of risk on nitrogen levels is highest
in Kanzara, where fertiliser use is more widespread: the risk elasticity of
nitrogen intensity is 0.7 for Aurepalle and 1.2 for Kanzara.5
The coefficients for landownership reflect the inter-village difference in
the availability of consumption-smoothing credit. In Aurepalle, house-
holds increase borrowing in low-income years. Large landowners have
more collateral and can borrow more. Hence, they can take more risk in
crop production and feel less need to use fertilisers to decrease risk.
Consequently, the coefficient for land ownership is significantly negative
in the Aurepalle probit equation. Land ownership does not affect fertiliser
use in Kanzara, where consumption smoothing credit is virtually absent.
The above indicates that the availability of production credit does limit
fertiliser use in the study villages. Land ownership increases loan access
and would positively affect fertiliser use if credit were constrained. The
absence of credit constraints is consistent with Kochar’s assertion that
working capital does not constrain agricultural production, as credit con-
straints do not affect land rental decisions. The results of Binswanger and
Khandker, which show that the availability of credit institutions increases
district-level fertiliser use, may be less relevant for our study villages: there
is a credit co-operative in either village. 
In Kanzara, liquid assets increase the use of risk-decreasing fertilisers,
just like they decrease the use of stabilizing male labour. This reflects pru-
dence: households prefer spending their own funds to taking a loan, which
they must repay even when yields are low. The positive effect of liquid
assets decreases at high levels of risk. On the other hand, the impact of
liquid assets on the probability of fertiliser use is negative in both villages,
and reflects the importance of liquid assets for consumption smoothing.
Also this effect decreases with the level of risk.
The significantly negative impact of the number of adults for the prob-
ability of fertiliser use in Aurepalle and the level of fertiliser use in Kanzara
confirms the important role of family labour in risk management.
Households are less inclined to adapt fertiliser use to manage risk if they
can use their labour endowment to cope with production risk. In Kanzara,
the amount of fertiliser used decreases by 1.4 kg/ha in response to an
additional family member, while in Aurepalle an additional family
member increases the probability of fertiliser uses by 5 per cent. The latter
effect is small: it would induce only two of the 144 predicted users of fer-
tilisers not to use fertilisers anymore. It is not surprising that the impact of
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5 These elasticities are computed at village means for fertiliser users.
family labour is largest in Kanzara. Households in this village have more
possibilities to use the labour market to manage risk.
The remaining results do not directly relate to risk and liquidity con-
straints, but present other interesting insights into the determinants of
fertiliser use. Input prices have only a limited impact on fertiliser use. The
own-price elasticity is negative for the Aurepalle probit equation but not
significantly different from zero in the other equations. The wage elasticity
is insignificant in all four equations. On the other hand, the price elastici-
ties for bullocks are negative. This indicates that animal traction and
inorganic nitrogen are complements: crops benefit more from fertilisers in
a well-worked soil. Although the negative coefficient for bullock owner-
ship in Kanzara is puzzling, the opposite coefficient in the Aurepalle probit
equation confirms the complementarity of animal traction and fertilisers.
Our estimates confirm the presence of an exogenous positive time trend
in the level of nitrogen use in Kanzara. Both the probability of fertilisation
and the level of nitrogen have increased in Kanzara. Surprisingly, the
regressions do not pick up the strong upward trend in the probability of
fertiliser use in Aurepalle that seems apparent from 1: the time trend in this
specific equation is positive but only significant at the 15 per cent level or
higher. Besides, the probability of fertiliser use increases with cultivated
area, while the nitrogen intensity decreases with the area size in both vil-
lages. These effects level off for very large farms.
As expected, irrigation is an important determinant of fertiliser use in
Aurepalle. The irrigation coefficients are positive in all equations, but only
significant in the probability equation for Aurepalle. These results are in
line with the observation that in both villages irrigated area has laid claim
to a relatively large share of fertilisers, but that in Kanzara dryland crops
also receive an appreciable amount. 
Finally, household skills have a significant impact on fertiliser use. The
age of the household head increases the level of nitrogen used in Kanzara
and the probability of nitrogen use in Aurepalle. Nevertheless, older farmers
apply smaller quantities of nitrogen than their younger colleagues do. Their
experience induces them to use fertilisers, but only in small quantities. The
farm caste dummy also reflects the importance of farming skills for fertiliser
use. Kanzara households from traditional farming castes are more likely to
use fertilisers and apply larger quantities. Literacy does not affect fertiliser
use, while secondary education decreases the level of nitrogen applied in
Aurepalle. Apparently, highly educated families make less of agriculture.
5. Conclusion and policy implications
Fertilisers are important inputs in smallholder production in India’s SAT.
Not only do they affect crop yields and profits, they also have a strong
impact on the future production capacity of dryland soils. Currently,
nutrient balances are strongly negative, and special efforts are required to
maintain soil productivity. As the potential for organic fertilisation is
limited, restoring nutrient balances involves a significant increase in fer-
tiliser use. In order to design effective policy measures for achieving this
goal, governments need a thorough insight into the determinants of small-
holder fertiliser use.
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This study presents a model that reveals the rationale behind decisions
on fertiliser use in a risky environment with financial market imperfections
and well-functioning labour markets. Credit constraints can prevent
farmers from buying the desired amount of fertiliser. The impact of risk is
subtler. Farmers with limited options to smooth consumption will try to
stabilize income. One way of doing this is adapting fertiliser use to account
for the effect of fertilisers on output variability. Depending on the crop
technology and the production environment, this may imply either an
increase or a decrease in fertiliser intensity compared to a risk-free setting.
The effects of both risk and credit constraints can be alleviated through
adaptations in family labour supply: labour income provides liquidity and
can stabilize total income.
The model presents a sound basis for empirical testing of the presumed
relations in India’s SAT. Contrary to previous studies, the empirical model
allows distinction between the effects of risk and credit constraints.
Estimates for two villages in India’s SAT reveal that risk strongly affects
fertiliser use: output variability increases the use of fertilisers in both vil-
lages. This implies that the village households utilize fertilisers to decrease
risk, which coincides with the behaviour of US farmers. The effects of the
farmers’ asset endowment on fertiliser use confirm this observation:
wealthier households, which are better able to smooth consumption, use
less inorganic nitrogen in either village. On the other hand, constraints on
short-term credit do not limit fertiliser use.
A starting point of this research was the notion that employment poli-
cies might affect fertiliser use. The model suggests that off-farm
employment decreases the effect of risk on fertiliser use and thus leads to
a lower use of fertilisers. This implies that the introduction of public
works or self-employment programmes in areas with high levels of dry-
season unemployment would diminish fertiliser use. Our regressions
confirm this effect: fertiliser use decreases in reaction to improved off-
farm employment opportunities as measured by the family labour
endowment. In other words, employment programmes, although valu-
able in their own respect, cannot be used to promote smallholder fertiliser
use.6
The empirical estimates suggest another interesting, although not very
surprising, direction for policy. In the study period, lack of knowledge has
limited fertiliser use. Older households from traditional farming families
use more fertilisers than their fellow villagers do. The greater familiarity of
farmers with modern inputs in later years explains probably at least part
of the positive time trend for nitrogen use. Given that India’s fertiliser use
was still low by the end of the 1990s, it seems, nevertheless, justified to con-
clude that extension is even now a suitable method to stimulate fertiliser
application. This is a more effective method than (changes in) price subsi-
dies: the nitrogen price did not significantly affect the nitrogen use during
the survey period. 
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6 On the other hand, stimulating off-farm employment could help decrease nutrient
pollution in high-production areas. To test this assertion, more information on the
specific production environment in these areas is needed.
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Appendix: Derivation of the planting-stage first-order conditions
The Lagrangian for the planting-stage is:
  U[w1(F1  L1)  B,T1  F1]  EU[(  w2)(f(A,L1,I) 
 h(A,L1,I))  w2F2  (1  r)B,T2  F2;Z]  (Bm  B)
(A1)
where F2 is a function of planting-stage decisions regarding L1, I, and B.
Besides, the first-order condition for the harvest stage is
U2  w2UC2 (A2)
Environment and Development Economics 505
The first-order condition for planting labour demand can be derived as
follows
 w1UC1  E{UC2[(p  w2)(fL1  hL1)  w2F2,L1]  U2F2,L1}  0 (A3a)
As U2  w2UC2 (Eq A2), this reduces to
 w1UC1  E{UC2(p  w2)(fL1  hL1)}  0 (A3b)
Which can be rewritten as follows
 w1UC1  (p  w2)(fL1EUC2  (p  w2)hL1E(UC2)  0 (A3c)
Hence
fL1   w1 (A3d)
A similar condition holds for fertiliser use.
E(UC2)

EUC
2
UC1

EUC
2
w1

p  w2
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